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Abstract 
By means of a split-ballot survey experiment, we study whether a normative instruction 
not to use the Internet when answering political knowledge questions reduces cheating 
in web surveys. The knowledge questions refer to basic facts about the European Union 
and the data come from the Italian National Election Study web panel carried out in 
Italy before the 2014 Eu opean Election. 
Our analysis shows that a simple normative instruction significantly reduces cheating. 
We also show that reducing cheating is important to achieve a correct assessment of 
reliability of knowledge scales, while a decrease of cheating leaves unaltered the 
knowledge gap between lower and higher educated respondents. 
These results invite caution when including political knowledge questions in an online 
survey. Our advice is to include a normative instruction not to search the Internet to 
reduce cheating and obtain more genuine answers. More generally, we conclude by 
stressing the need to consider the implications of online data collection when building 
questionnaires for public opinion research.  
 
Keywords: Cheating in web surveys, Survey experiments, Political knowledge, 
European Union, Reliability and validity 
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The rise of web surveys has raised concerns of potential non-random biases related 
to the measurement of political knowledge. In particular, attention has been paid to a 
phenomenon labelled as “cheating in web surveys” (Jensen and Thomsen 2014), when 
web survey respondents give a correct answer after having searched the Internet for it. 
Thanks to search engines like Google, respondents can in fact find the right answer to a 
knowledge question in just a few seconds. In light of these considerations, researchers 
have started to explore strategies to overcome the problem of on-line cheating. The 
solutions proposed have been various in nature, with some researchers simply 
suggesting to ask respondents not to look up the answers on the Internet. Following this 
hint, our study analyses the effect of the introduction of a normative prompt dissuading 
web searches when answering political knowledge questions by means of a split-ballot 
web survey experiment.  
In this study, we follow this hint, controlling the efficacy of a normative prompt 
dissuading web searches to reduce cheating when answering political knowledge 
questions. We do so by running a survey experiment manipulating the introduction to a 
battery of knowledge questions on basic facts about the European Union (EU). After an 
introduction on political knowledge questions in web surveys, we describe the 
experimental design. We then present data, measures and methods, we illustrate the 
results and we close the article with a discussion on the implications of our findings for 
Page 4 of 30
Cambridge University Press
Italian Political Science Review
For Peer Review
 
4 
 
the measurement of political knowledge in web surveys and, more generally, for online 
research on public opinion.  
 
Political knowledge questions in web surveys 
Political knowledge is commonly defined as “a measure of a citizen's ability to 
provide correct answers to a specific set of fact-based questions” (Boudreau and Lupia 
2011, 171). Thus, political knowledge refers to the individual level of factual 
knowledge on political issues. Political knowledge is crucial in the study of political 
behavior and public opinion, as Jensen and Thomsen (2014) highlight in their literature 
review: 193 studies published in four top journals of that strand of research (Political 
Behavior, Political Psychology, Political Communication and Public Opinion Quarterly) 
over the time span 2002-2012 have examined it as either a dependent or independent 
variable. Generally, political knowledge is not regarded as a concept per se, but is used 
as an indicator of political sophistication (Luskin 1987) and the related concepts of 
political expertise, awareness and involvement (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993). 
Batteries of factual items are the most employed tool to measure the concept, 
although some studies underline how little individual motivation there is to answer 
those kinds of question correctly, with the associated risk of underestimating 
respondents’ political knowledge (Prior and  Lupia 2008). 
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Further difficulties to address knowledge questions have emerged with the 
increased use of web surveys in public opinion research1. The well-known advantages 
of this data collection mode (Callegaro, Lozar Manfreda and Vehovar 2015, 18-25) 
come with a cost, especially in terms of control over the interview environment. This 
shortcoming of online questionnaires is particularly relevant in the case of questions 
that require an answer that can be found on the Internet. 
Previous research has empirically tested the cheating behavior of respondents in 
web surveys. In an experimental study which randomly allocates individuals either to a 
computer lab or to an online administration of the same questionnaire, Clifford and Jerit 
(2014) find that the rate of right answers to political knowledge items is significantly 
higher in the online condition, suggesting the presence of cheating when control over 
the respondent decreases. Similarly, Jensen and Thomsen find that a substantial 22% of 
the respondents to a web survey admit to having used the Internet to answer questions 
on political knowledge2. 
As to the strategies to overcome the problem of on-line cheating, Vavreck (2012) 
states that the main issue to be addressed is the low level of environmental control when 
                                                            
1 In the above mentioned literature review, Jensen and Thomsen report that 23% 
of the studies examined are web-based.   
2 The text of the question is the following: “The Internet has made it much easier 
for ordinary people to get access to information about important questions. Many use 
the Internet on a regular basis. Therefore, we would like to know if you used the 
Internet when answering one or more of the previous four questions?” (Jensen and 
Thomsen 2014, 3348).  
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administering on-line questionnaires. The presence of a controlled environment, 
however, is by definition in contrast with the web surveys design. Thus, Vavreck 
suggests testing the presence of cheating by downloading the browser histories of 
respondents. On one side, this strategy represents an effective way to detect cheaters 
but, on the other side, it is difficult to implement and does not work as an antidote to 
deceptive behavior. Other scholars recommend introducing a time limit when answering 
political knowledge questions (Iyengar et al. 2010; Strabac and Aalberg 2011). 
Although partially successful, that strategy cannot prevent cheating, considering that in 
most cases online search for correct answers takes fewer seconds than any reasonable 
time limit could hope to prevent (Jensen and Thomsen 2014). Recently, Munzert and 
Selb (2015) have tested the use of visual questions as an antidote against cheating. 
Nonetheless, their findings do not prove the efficacy of visual instruments in reducing 
cheating. 
 In the face of such difficulties, Shulman and Boster (2014, 187) propose simpler 
and more straightforward advice: that some “suggestions to discourage online cheating 
[should] include adding information not to look up answers online”. The strength of 
such a recommendation finds its foundation in the idea that an individual will behave 
consistently with the implicit commitment taken when exposed to the normative 
message, reducing potentially problematic behavior (Cialdini 1984, 51-57; Schultz et al. 
2007). Following this suggestion, by means of a split-ballot web survey experiment our 
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study analyses the effect of the introduction of a normative prompt dissuading web 
searches when answering political knowledge questions.   
 
Experimental design and hypotheses 
The respondents to a web survey (N = 3,243) are assigned either to a treatment 
group or to a control group through a simple randomization. The experiment 
manipulates the preamble to a battery of three political knowledge items. Next to a 
neutral introduction to the political knowledge questions, the treated group receives a 
normative instruction that invites respondents not to search the Internet for the correct 
answers. The text of the two parts is as follows: 
Neutral introduction: Finally, we will propose some questions on political knowledge. 
Normative instruction: We ask you to answer without searching the Internet. 
 
The precise formulations of the experimental conditions are as follows: 
Control  (Neutral introduction) 
Treatment (Neutral introduction) + (Normative instruction) 
 
The first aim of the experiment is to test whether such a simple normative 
instruction is successful in reducing cheating behavior. We thus expect that in the 
treatment group the proportion of correct answers to the knowledge questions is lower, 
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as the number of people giving correct answers is not inflated by cheaters. Assuming 
that neither treatment decreases knowledge nor its absence increases it, the difference 
between the two groups could be fully attributed to the deterrent effect against cheating 
of the normative prompt. When treated, fewer respondents search the Internet and 
consequently fewer respondents give a correct answer without knowing it. 
Secondly, we control the impact of cheating on the reliability and validity of an 
additive knowledge scale. Although a good measurement should be both reliable and 
valid (Carmines and Zeller 1979), we hypothesize a paradoxical outcome with 
increasing reliability coupled with a degradation of validity when cheating is more 
widespread (control group). In fact, more cheating produces a higher proportion of 
respondents with full scores (all correct answers) which artificially inflates inter-item 
correlations between the knowledge items. However, for cheaters, those high scores do 
not indicate higher knowledge, jeopardizing the validity of the scale. 
Finally, we look at whether cheating alters the relation between knowledge and 
socio-demographic dimensions, focusing on education. Previous research based on self-
reported cheating found that lower educated respondents show a higher probability (of 
reporting) of having searched the Internet to answer knowledge questions in web 
surveys (Jensen and Thomsen 2014). Consequently, it has been argued that in web 
surveys the educational gap in political knowledge could be underestimated, as lower 
educated respondents compensate for their lack of knowledge by booting up the 
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Internet. Our expectation is therefore that the distance in knowledge performance 
between educational groups is larger (and more genuine) in the treatment condition, 
where cheating is reduced by the effect of the normative prompt. 
 
Data, measures and methods 
Data come from the third wave of the Italian National Election Study (ITANES) 
on-line panel, which spans over the Italian electoral cycle 2013-2015. The survey was 
carried out immediately before the 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections, which 
took place on the 25th of May, 2014. 
The sample is made of 3,243 individuals, selected from an opt-in community group 
of a private research company (SWG). It is a non-probabilistic sample aiming to 
reproduce the quotas for gender, age and territorial distribution of the Italian population.  
Although the sample non-representativeness can be an issue when aiming at 
producing inferences to the general population, in this paper we focus on a specific 
cognitive mechanism and we overcome the sample weaknesses by a randomized 
experimental design. 
The questionnaire includes a three-item battery on knowledge of European Union 
(political) matters, as in De Vreese and Boomgarden (2006). The reason to test EU 
knowledge rather than general (or national) political knowledge is connected to the 
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framework of the survey, aimed at studying electoral behavior in EP elections. The 
questions were: 
 
Item A. How many countries are members of the European Union? (Correct answer: 
28) 
Item B. Who is the European People’s Party (EPP) candidate for the presidency of the 
European commission? Multiple choice, 5 options (Correct answer: Juncker) 
Item C. Who is the Party of European Socialists (PES) candidate for the presidency of 
the European commission? Multiple choice, 5 options (Correct answer: 
Schulz) 
 
The three items differ both in answer mode and content (Barabas et al. 2014). As 
far as content is concerned, while item A tests general knowledge, also defined as 
textbook knowledge (Jennings 1996), items B and C address surveillance knowledge, 
relative to current events. Looking at the answer mode, the question on the number of 
countries belonging to EU (item A) is open-ended with a short numeric answer, while 
the other two questions (item B and C) are multiple choice. This implies that 
respondents have higher chances of guessing the correct answer for those items 
(Shulman and Boster 2014). The option “don’t know” was allowed only for item A 
(filling “9999”, as indicated in the text of the question). For item B and C, respondents 
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were forced to give an answer and “don’t know” was not allowed (Mondak and Davis 
2001)3.  
In the coming analysis, EU political knowledge is measured considering the 
answers to each item separately and by an additive scale reporting for each respondent 
the sum of correct answers to the three knowledge questions. 
The effect of treatment will be tested through the comparison of the aggregate 
proportions of correct answers in the two experimental groups.  
In the assessment of the impact of cheating on the quality of the knowledge scale 
measure we will perform reliability analysis and we will consider construct validity. 
As for reliability, Pearson’s correlations
4
 among the three knowledge items and 
their internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) will be calculated for the two groups. If 
cheating biases the performance in a non-random way, thereby increasing the chances 
of giving correct answers to all the items, we expect that pairwise correlations and 
Cronbach’s alpha will be higher in the control group.    
As for construct validity
5
, we will compute Pearson’s correlations between the 
knowledge scale and two theoretically related variables (Atkin, Galloway and Nayman 
                                                            
3 Full description of the items and distributions are available in the online 
Appendix. 
4 In 2x2 tables, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient coincides with the phi 
coefficient for two binary variables. 
5 Construct validity is defined as “the extent to which a particular measure relates 
to other measures consistent with theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the 
concepts (or constructs) that are being measured” (Carmines and Zeller 1979, 23). 
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1976; Liu and Eveland 2005; Eveland and Hively 2009): interest in the election 
outcome measured by an 11-point scale and frequency of political discussion in the last 
month by a 5-point scale (0: never, 4: every day). In both cases, we expect positive 
correlations which increase in the treatment group, less biased by cheating. Finally, the 
impact of education on cheating will be tested by means of a linear regression 
(dependent variable: additive knowledge scale), adding interaction terms between the 
treatment condition (normative instruction) and education (3 categories: primary, 
secondary, tertiary), controlling for gender and age (3 categories: 18-34, 35-54, 55 and 
older). A positive interaction coefficient indicates that the gap between educational 
groups increases in the treatment condition, that is when cheating is reduced.  
 
Results 
Comparing the proportion of correct answers in the two experimental groups, it 
turns out that the performance on knowledge items is significantly lower in the 
treatment group. Assuming that neither treatment decreases knowledge nor its absence 
increases it, the difference between the two groups could be fully attributed to the 
deterrent effect against cheating of the normative prompt. Table 1 shows that this holds 
for all the items (p-values < 0.01)6. Thus, the simple strategy of adding a normative 
                                                            
6 Regardless of the experimental condition the three knowledge questions meet 
the criterion introduced by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993, 1187), who suggest avoiding 
items either too easy (correct answers > 90%) or too difficult (correct answers < 10%). 
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instruction not to look up answers on the Internet turns out to work as a successful 
antidote to cheating.  
Considering the different items, the open-ended question produces larger 
differences between the two experimental groups (10 percentage points, against 6 and 7 
percentage points respectively for the items B and C). However, it is difficult to say 
whether this difference should be attributed either to the answer mode or to the 
difficulty of the item, being A also the most difficult item7. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The last row of Table 1 shows the proportions of respondents who answered 
correctly to all the three questions on EU political knowledge. Again the difference 
between the two experimental groups is highly significant (p-value < 0.01) and in the 
expected direction. This outcome brings us directly to the next step of our analysis that 
is the evaluation of the impact of cheating on the quality of the knowledge 
measurement. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
A complete distribution of the answers to the three knowledge questions, including the 
distribution of wrong answers, is supplied in Appendix A1 and A2. 
7 An experimental study considering knowledge questions with different levels of 
complexity did not find an association between cheating activities and difficulties of the 
items (Clifford and Jerit 2016).  
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As stated in the previous section, cheating can affect correlations between the 
different knowledge items and consequently influence the reliability of the scale built 
using those items. Our findings are in line with these expectations. Pairwise correlations 
between knowledge items are always higher in the control group (see Table 2), although 
the difference is not statistically significant for the item combination B - C. The same 
applies for the internal consistency of the knowledge scale (Cronbach’s alpha, last row 
of Table 2). These findings bring us to an immediate consideration: when a battery of 
political knowledge items is included in a web survey, the reliability analysis can lead to 
misleading conclusions about the quality of measurement, since cheating behaviors 
artificially increase the internal consistency of the scale.  
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The degradation of the validity of the measurement when cheating is more diffuse 
should represent the other side of the coin. However, the results in terms of construct 
validity are not as clear as the ones on reliability. Although political knowledge is 
significantly correlated in the expected theoretical direction with the two indicators used 
to test construct validity (interest in the election outcome and frequency of political 
discussion), differences between the two experimental groups are not significant (table 
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A3 in the Appendix). Therefore, there is no empirical evidence supporting the idea of a 
decreasing validity when cheating is more widespread. 
The last step of our analysis concerns the study of the impact of cheating on the 
relation between knowledge and education. To do so, we put our knowledge scale 
within a regression framework where education is interacted with the experimental 
condition (reference category = control group)8, controlling for gender and age. 
If cheating is more widespread among lower educated people, cheating could 
compensate for lack of knowledge in that group and accordingly reduce the effect of 
education on the additive knowl dge scale. Conversely, a reduction in cheating (which 
actually happens in the treatment condition) should lead to an increase in the knowledge 
gap between education groups. If this is the case, we should find a positive interaction 
effect between education and treatment and increased distances in the knowledge scores 
for the different educational groups in the treatment condition. 
No empirical evidence supporting these expectations emerges from the analysis. 
Although the main effects for education, as well as for the other socio-demographic 
variables, go in the expected direction (more education enhances knowledge, men know 
more than women, and older people know more than the younger), the interaction terms 
are not significantly different from zero, indicating that the effect of education does not 
                                                            
8
 A similar regression approach has been proposed for the study of social desirability in 
the framework of list experiments, where it is not known how each respondent reacts to 
a sensitive item presented in a longer list of control items. See for example Janus 
(2010). 
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increase in the treatment group. This outcome becomes clearer if we look at Figure 1: 
the three parallel lines indicate that the distance in performance on the knowledge scale 
between groups of respondents characterized by different levels of education remains 
the same in both the treatment and control group. That is, a reduction in cheating in the 
treatment group does not increase the knowledge gap between lower and higher 
educated respondents. Full regression results are presented in the Appendix A4.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
Measuring factual (political) knowledge in web surveys is a difficult business, as 
respondents who do not know the correct answer to a question can easily find it by 
searching the Internet. What is defined as “cheating in web-surveys” (Jensen and 
Thomsen 2014) is therefore harmful for our knowledge measurement, potentially 
affected by non-random biases.  
Our study explored the effectiveness of introducing simple normative instructions 
to reduce cheating in web surveys. We did so by implementing a split-ballot experiment 
on a sample of Italian citizens coming from a web-based electoral survey carried out 
before the EP election 2014 (N > 3,000). While the interviewees belonging to the 
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control group received only a neutral introduction to a battery of knowledge questions 
on basic European facts, those belonging to the treatment group were also presented 
with a normative prompt inviting them to answer the questions without searching the 
Internet. The results are straightforward as the group of treated respondents consistently 
showed lower percentages of correct answers (to a maximum of 10 percentage points 
difference on a question concerning the number of countries in the EU). Realistically 
assuming that the administration of the normative instruction did not decrease the 
knowledge of respondents, the worse results in the treated group can only be attributed 
to a decrease in cheating following the invitation not to search the Internet. This 
outcome highlights two important elements: 
- cheating in web surveys is a widespread phenomenon; 
- simple normative instructions work effectively to reduce cheating. 
Prevention of cheating is relevant given that such behaviour affects the properties 
of our measures, potentially resulting in misleading evaluations. We indeed found that 
the correlations between knowledge items as well as the reliability of the additive 
knowledge scale artificially increases when cheating is more diffuse. We did not find 
any evidence, otherwise, of a degradation of the validity of our measure due to cheating. 
The reason for this negative finding can be linked to the fact that the battery of items 
used in the experiment is not as well-established nor widely tested as the one 
recommended by Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996). For more compelling results, then, 
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we should wait for further research based on more established measures of political 
knowledge. 
Finally, we did not find support for the hypothesis that suggests that cheating is 
more diffuse among lower educated respondents and consequently that cheating 
enhances their performances, closing the gap with more educated respondents (Jensen 
and Thomsen 2014). This outcome is coherent with a reading that suggests, on one 
hand, that cheating is a crosscutting phenomenon, whilst, on the other, that the 
effectiveness of normative instructions not to cheat is seemingly effective on all 
educational groups. Our results signal that previous findings showing a higher 
prevalence of cheating among lower educated respondents could be an artefact 
produced by the use of self-reported measures of cheating. In fact, higher educated 
people could be more vulnerable to social desirability and thus report cheating less 
often.  
  Of course, our analyses are not without shortcomings. The main limitation of our 
study is connected to the fact that we do not have individual level measures on the 
actual presence of the cheating behaviour. Our conclusions are therefore drawn at the 
aggregate level and the reduction of cheating due to the normative instruction is 
deduced by the comparison of the average performances on knowledge questions in the 
control and treatment group. The actual amount of cheating remains unknown as well as 
whether a person has cheated or not. This does not jeopardize our conclusion on the 
Page 19 of 30
Cambridge University Press
Italian Political Science Review
For Peer Review
 
19 
 
effectiveness of normative instructions against cheating, but it does hinder any further 
analysis aimed at studying the relation between cheating and individual characteristics. 
Moreover, any disputes over compliance with normative instructions and the effects of 
social desirability cannot be conclusively settled with our data since a valid indicator of 
cheating at the individual level is not available. Further research will be necessary to 
deepen these aspects. Finally, it is important to remember that our conclusions come 
from an intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis and it is not possible to be sure that respondents 
actually read and considered the normative instruction (Berinsky, Margolis and Sances 
2014). 
To overcome some of these weaknesses, a suggestion could be to couple split ballot 
experiments like ours with the administration in the same interview of a question on 
self-reported cheating to triangulate the results (Clifford and Jerit 2016). A further 
articulation of this advice could go in the direction of asking about cheating behavior 
not directly but by means of a list experiment (Blair and Imai 2012) to be able to better 
estimate the magnitude of the phenomenon and to assess the effect of social desirability 
on the reports. Following the guideline suggested by Munzert and Selb (2015), the 
measurement of the response latencies (that is the time used to answer a question) could 
represent another strategy to detect cheating, allowing for a more precise assessment of 
the impact of the normative instruction. 
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All things considered, we still maintain that the main result of our study is robust: a 
normative instruction not to search the Internet for help with answering knowledge 
questions is an effective tool to reduce cheating in web surveys. Thus, the advice when 
administering knowledge questions in web surveys is always to use a cheap and non-
intrusive tool, such as this, in order to obtain more genuine results. 
What we have shown in this article pertains to a specific kind of question meant to 
measure the knowledge of respondents. The peculiarity of these questions is that they 
usually only have one correct answer, either to be guessed (open ended) or chosen 
between a list of options (multiple choice). In the case of web surveys, where the 
control of the researcher over the interviewee is absent, these questions are particularly 
vulnerable to cheating behaviour. Nonetheless, the modality in which data are collected 
does not only affect knowledge questions. Each measure conceived to tap into a certain 
concept and included in an online questionnaire should be adapted to that data 
collection mode, considering that a self-administered online questionnaire largely 
differs from a face-to-face or telephone interview. Thus, the results invite us to pay 
further attention to this issue, promoting a broader use of survey experiments to enhance 
our understanding of the cognitive mechanisms at work beneath the activity of 
answering structured questionnaires (Sirken et al. 1999). This could help in the process 
of calibration and standardization of measurement instruments in public opinion 
research, improving both their reliability and validity.   
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Note on Replication Material 
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The replication dataset is available at http://thedata.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/ipsr-risp 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1. Proportions of correct answers on political knowledge items in the two groups 
   % correct answers     
Control Treatment Chi-square(1) P-value 
Item A. Number of EU Countries 35.0 24.5 42.8 0.000 
Item B. EPP Candidate 50.3 44.2 12.0 0.001 
Item C. PES Candidate 66.8 59.7 17.8 0.000 
     
All 3 items correct 22.5 13.7 41.6 0.000 
N 1,631 1,612     
 
 
Table 2. Item correlations for knowledge questions, Cronbach’s alpha of the additive 
knowledge scale and Z-test on differences between the two experimental groups 
Item 
combinations 
Questions 
 
Control 
(N=1,631) 
Treatment 
(N=1,612) 
Two-tailed 
Z-test
$
 
Sig. 
(two-tailed) 
A – B EU countries - EPP candidate 0.30 0.23 1.99 0.047 
A – C EU countries - PES candidate 0.26 0.16 2.92 0.003 
B – C EPP candidate-PES candidate 0.39 0.37 0.93 0.354 
      
 
   
Two-tailed 
W-test
#
 
 
A - B – C Cronbach’s alpha 0.58 0.50 0.84 0.000 
 
$ Differences between correlation coefficients tested using Fisher r-to-Z transformation. 
# Differences between two Cronbach alpha’s tested using the Feldt test (Feldt 1969). 
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Figure 1. Predicted means of knowledge scores by experimental condition and level of 
education from the previous regression analysis (95% confidence intervals) 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Political knowledge items: Question text, answer mode and answer 
categories  
Question formulation 
Answer 
mode 
Answer 
categories 
Correct 
answer 
“Don’t 
know” option 
     
Item A.  How many countries are 
members of the European 
Union ?  
Short 
numeric 
Open-ended 28 9999 
   
Item B.  Who is the European 
People’s Party (EPP) 
candidate for the 
presidency of the 
European commission? 
Multiple 
choice 
Verhofstadt  
Keller 
Schulz 
Tsipras 
Juncker 
Junker Not allowed 
  
Item C.  Who is the Party of 
European Socialists (PES) 
candidate for the 
presidency of the 
European commission? 
Multiple 
choice 
Verhofstadt  
Keller 
Schulz 
Tsipras 
Juncker 
Schulz Not allowed 
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Figure A1. Distribution of the answers to Item A by experimental condition 
Item A: How many countries are members of the European Union? 
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Table A2. Distributions of the answers to Item B and Item C by experimental condition 
Item B: Who is the European People’s Party (EPP) candidate for the presidency of the European 
commission? 
Item C: Who is the Party of European Socialists (PES) candidate for the presidency of the European 
commission?  
Column percentages 
  Item B    Item C 
Candidate Control Treatment   Candidate Control Treatment 
Verhofstadt 8 8 Verhofstadt 5 7 
Keller 6 6 Keller 6 7 
Schulz 27 32 Schulz 67 60 
Tsipras 9 9 Tsipras 9 12 
Juncker 50 44 Juncker 13 15 
          
N 1,631 1,612   N 1,631 1,612 
Note: the options in boxes represent the correct answer. 
 
Table A3.  Correlations between knowledge scale and other related variables and two-
tailed Z-tests on the differences of the correlations between the experimental groups 
Variables Control Treatment Z-test N 
Interest in the electoral outcome (0-10) 0.15 0.21 1.57 3,060 
Frequency of political discussion (0-4) 0.19 0.20 0.31 3,150 
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Table A4. The impact of demographics on political knowledge  
(N = 3,242, 1 missing value for education) 
Variables Categories Coeff. s.e. Sig. (two-tailed) 
     
Constant  1.27 (0.07) (0.000) 
     
Experimental condition 
(ref.: control) 
Treatment -0.19 (0.09) (0.028) 
     
Gender 
(ref.: male) 
Female -0.21 (0.04) (0.000) 
Education Medium 0.27 (0.07) (0.000) 
(ref.: low) High  0.40 (0.08) (0.000) 
Age  35-54 0.06 (0.05) (0.162) 
(ref.: 18-34) >54 0.20 (0.05) (0.000) 
     
Interaction terms     
Exp. condition*Education Treatment * Medium  -0.05 (0.10) (0.622) 
 Treatment * High  -0.05 (0.11) (0.678) 
     
Adjusted R-squared  0.04   
Note: Unstandardized OLS regression coefficients: Standard Errors and p-values in parentheses 
 
 
 
Page 31 of 30
Cambridge University Press
Italian Political Science Review
